So we’ve won - and yes, I do believe we as the United States have won - but as the long crawl toward January a number of questions are coming up.

Since this blog is partly (almost tangentially) to do with Japan-US relations, I’ll pose some of the more obvious questions here.

What will be the Obama policy toward Japan?

There is hope that the State Department’s hands will finally be untied, and that there will be a drastic decrease in the outsourcing of security assets (including CIA and the other abbreviations) which would have the effect of restoring national footing, but the additional staffing to increase presence in Japan seems unlikely.

Officially, the transition site mentions Japan but once:

Seek New Partnerships in Asia: Obama and Biden will forge a more effective framework in Asia that goes beyond bilateral agreements, occasional summits, and ad hoc arrangements, such as the six-party talks on North Korea. They will maintain strong ties with allies like Japan, South Korea and Australia; work to build an infrastructure with countries in East Asia that can promote stability and prosperity; and work to ensure that China plays by international rules.

In both the speech and policy implied by the above statement there is a likelihood that the dialog between international governments will be improved by the new administration, but after seeing Koizumi and Bush discuss peanut butter and nanner sandwiches on a Graceland trip, the bar is lower than it’s been since the war.

The last few presidencies have shown that contemporary US policy for Japan is often set by the necessity of action rather than a dedicated philosophy; keeping the trigger locks on in both Koreas, and managing threats in the China sea often shape what is all too often a cursory interaction with the nation where 33,000 (wiki) troops are still stationed. Given this and a set of national calamities, it is likely that an Obama presidency will do no more than visit the country that will be seen as more of a catwalk to their more pressing issues.

The open question remains, however, as the transition continues to form, of how the new staff perceives Japan, and whether Aso and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) can make the argument that many of you reading already know.

The potential is immense.

Though the balancing act of deployment and cost will play out throughout the bases of Japan, a new administration could develop stronger cultural and security ties to Japan. By placing more emphasis on exchange and relaxing visa requirements, a grass roots cross-fertilization is possible, and an acknowledgement of mutual interest could foster an increase in cooperation along the lines of infrastructure (high speed trains come to mind). We’ve seen some initiatives along these lines in the past, from Chamber of Commerces and trade organizations, but nothing short of national incentives are likely to spark the awareness necessary to create such symbiosis.

Naturally, Japan is an obvious partner in security. Japan is the only ally to border China, Russia, and the Koreas, and shares the US interest in containing the power of those countries. In a play for balance, Japan could be the stem of the scale.

Running low on time, so let me throw out some ideas to start the discussion.

Option: Shared Economic Interest
Develop green development with partnership between existing companies. Handholding by national trade org.

Option: Education of Allies Initiative
Allies of the United States, in good standing and with reciprical agreements, enjoy a cut in the cost of foreign education in the US

Option: Allowance for Allied Business
Allies of the United States, in good standing and with reciprical agreements, enjoy a reduction in tax requirements

I want someone smarter than me to run the country. Why would you want someone dumber?